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REAL PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided three noteworthy cases in the
area of real property during the 1994-1995 survey period.' These cases ad-
dress issues of eminent domain, public lands, and water courses.
Part I of this Survey discusses third party authority to condemn property
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).2 In United States v. Hardage,3 the Tenth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court and at least two other federal circuits by using CERCLA to
interpret a federal statute's permanent taking authority. Part II considers the
valuation of undeveloped subsurface minerals for admittedly "taken" property.
United States v. Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc.' solidified current Tenth
Circuit law despite seemingly contrary Supreme Court and circuit authority.
Part III addresses an ambiguous land grant from the federal government. Cir-
cuit courts disagree as to whether state or federal law controls this issue. In
Koch v. United States Department of Interior,' a case of first impression, the
Tenth Circuit utilized state law to interpret an ambiguous federal land grant.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN AND THIRD PARTY AUTHORITY TO CONDEMN:
UNITED STATES V. HARDAGE6
A. Background
1. Congressional Grant of Condemnation Power
The United States Constitution reserves to the government the right to
take property for public use when it justly compensates the owner.' Congress
may confer this power of eminent domain upon whatever entity it selects.8
1. This Survey covers cases decided from September 1994 to September 1995.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
3. 58 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1995).
4. 60 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
5. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995).
6. 58 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1995).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a theoretical overview of eminent domain, see Maria
Mansfield, When "Private" Rights Meet "Public" Rights: The Problems of Labeling and Regula-
tory Takings, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (1994). See generally George W. Miller & Jonathan L.
Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 863, 863 (1993) (surveying cases decided by
the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1991 through 1993); Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A.,
C975 ALI-ABA 333, 333-57 (1995) (providing an overview of the history of eminent domain and
offering recommendations to promote a more equitable balance between the interest of the public
at large and the individual property owner).
8. IA JuLius L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03(3), at 3-58 to 3-76 (rev.
3d ed. 1995) (noting that the party must be bound to use the property taken for public use).
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The grant of condemnation power, however, must exist in express statutory
terms.9 In addition, no one with a special grant of eminent domain power may
delegate that authority without a legislative designation.' ° Most importantly,
an exercise of condemnation power must derive its source from a statute."
2. The All Writs Act 2 Power of Condemnation
If the legislature makes no affirmative grant of authority, the judicial
branch may effect a condemnation through the federal "All Writs Act"
(AWA). 3 In order to broaden judicial condemnation power through the
AWA, an issuance: (1) must be appropriate to aid the court's existing jurisdic-
tion; and (2) comply with "the usages and principles of law." 4 The AWA
does not grant independent jurisdiction; it only strengthens condemnation
power that independently preexists. 5
The AWA authorizes a taking under certain highly specific circumstances.
The most expansive interpretation of the AWA is found in United States v.
New York Telephone Co. 6 In New York Telephone, the Supreme Court in-
voked AWA authority to allow a partial, temporary taking by physical occupa-
tion of a company's phones lines. 7
9. Id. The courts may also read a grant into a statute through "necessary implication" when
the grant would be without force in the absence of an implication. Pennsylvania R.R. Company's
Appeal, 93 Pa. 150 (1878) (finding that an act granting the railroad right-of-ways was impotent
without condemnation power); see IA SACKMAN, supra note 8, § 3.21.4, at 3-62 (noting that the
party must have no control over the situation creating the necessity).
10. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 594, 598, 603 (1904) (holding
that the lessee of a corporation with power of eminent domain cannot exercise that right).
11. IA SACKMAN, supra note 8, § 3.03(12), at 3-194 to 3-195 (noting that Congress may
grant the power of eminent domain to an individual, but the delegation must be explicitly granted
by statute).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994). "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
13. 28 U.S.C § 1651.
14. Id.; see also Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66, 69 (10th Cir. 1970) (granting an
injunction to solve segregation problems as pursuant to the AWA "necessary and appropriate"
standard), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
15. 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3932, at 185
(1977). There are two requirements under the AWA: (1) the case has some potential for an inde-
pendent source of jurisdiction, and (2) the writ will aid that jurisdiction. Id. at 188; see Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34-37 (1980) (reversing mandamus to restore a jury
verdict because parties may not immediately appeal an order granting a new trial). The Supreme
Court has said that the AWA is not a jurisdictional blank check, and thus, "it does not authorize
[courts] to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient
or less appropriate." Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S.
34, 43 (1985) (holding the district court's use of the AWA improper absent a showing of "excep-
tional circumstances").
16. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
17. New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 176-78. FBI officials had probable cause to believe that
illegal gambling was occurring by telephone. The telephone company refused, however, to comply
with a court order requiring it to lease the telephone lines to the FBI for surveillance purposes. Id.
at 161-62. The Supreme Court held that although "unreasonable burdens may not be imposed"
under the AWA, the AWA authorized commands to thwart frustration of a prior court order. Id. at
172. The Court found especially persuasive the circumstances where: (1) the company allowed the
illegal actions; (2) the company had a public duty; (3) the order was not burdensome; and (4) the
FBI had no alternative method to accomplish its goals. Id. at 174-75.
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The AWA may also force compliance with a previous court order frustrat-
ed by the acts of an individual. 8 Occasionally, this power can extend to indi-
viduals who "have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice."'9 Frus-
tration traditionally includes wrongful obstruction of an order or public duty
by one party.'
3. Congressional Grant of Condemnation Power: CERCLA
CERCLA2' provides for condemnation of Superfund cleanup sites and
adjacent land.22 Although commentators and courts interpret this provision
liberally in order to secure beneficial environmental goals, 3 the statutory lan-
guage does not grant condemnation powers to third parties.24 Trustees with
the power to bring a CERCLA damage claim include local governments,
states, and federal government departments.25 Consequently, the private party
charged with cleaning up a hazardous site has no power under CERCLA to
procure any necessary private property.
18. See id. at 172 (noting repeated Supreme Court recognition of the AWA grant of power
to prevent frustration of prior orders); Kemp v. Peterson, 940 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1991) (find-
ing no abuse of discretion in an order intending to facilitate monitoring of compliance with an
earlier order).
19. New York TeL, 434 U.S. at 174 (allowing a court to find frustration if people, "though
not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the im-
plementation of a court order"); see also United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir.)
(finding that third parties must answer questions and produce books despite self-incrimination
privilege), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 908 (1952); United States
v. McHie, 196 F. 586, 587-88 (N.D. I11. 1912) (finding power in the AWA to impound books
illegally seized by the government where they were necessary evidence).
20. Frustration is more readily found when one party has a public duty to protect the public
interest. See New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 174 (finding that the telephone company had taken on a
public duty); Federal Trade Comin'n v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 608 (1966) (preventing
the consummation of an illegal merger); Public Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F.2d
242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (granting an injunction based on the Public Utilities Commission's ties
to Congress).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995). The original proceeding in Hardage came under 1980
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980), as opposed to the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986)
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j) (1988). See generally Bruce P. Howard & Kevin E. Solliday,
CERCLA and Similar State Laws: Overview and Current Developments, 797 Prac. L. Inst.Corp.
L. & Prac. 39 (1992) (describing the basic fundamentals of Superfund sites). A Superfund site
contains hazardous waste, is designated to receive federal funding for cleanup, and imposes liabili-
ty for most of the costs on private parties once owning the land. Id. at 39-40.
23. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst Cir. 1986)
(interpreting CERCLA to eliminate a "procedural obstacle that would otherwise hamper the efforts
of private parties"); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
1985) (refusing to interpret CERCLA to frustrate the environmental goals of the statute without
affinative congressional intent).
24. Although the original 1980 CERCLA made no provision for condemnation, the amend-
ments provide for presidential condemnation authority. 42 U.S.C. § 96070)(1) (providing that
"[tlhe President is authorized to acquire, by purchase, lease, condemnation, donation, or otherwise,
any real property or any interest in property that the President in his discretion determines is need-
ed to conduct a remedial action under this chapter"). See generally Carter H. Strickland, Jr., The
Scope of Authority of Natural Resource Trustees, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 303 (1995) (pro-
viding background on authority to condemn under CERCLA).
25. Strickland, supra note 24, at 303-04. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may
condemn a piece of property for public use as a CERCLA Superfund site, but third parties have
no statutory authority to do the same. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j)(1).
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B. United States v. Hardage26
1. Facts
The United States filed suit under CERCLA to compel the Hardage Steer-
ing Committee (HSC) to implement remedial cleanup of a Superfund site.27
The cleanup order necessitated the acquisition of the neighboring property,
owned by Mr. Whitehead." HSC failed to negotiate a price for forty acres of
Mr. Whitehead's dairy farm, and instead initiated a third party complaint seek-
ing to take the land.29 HSC cited ancillary jurisdiction for condemnation au-
thority under the inherent powers of the court through CERCLA and the
AWA.3" The trial court compelled the condemnation through the AWA.3"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit refused to extend the AWA to provide authority for a
permanent taking because CERCLA does not grant such power.32 Determin-
ing that the broadest application of the AWA granted authority for only a
temporary physical occupation,33 the court found nothing in the language of
the AWA that would vest district courts with such extensive condemnation
jurisdiction.34 For such an extension, the AWA would require a finding that
Mr. Whitehead frustrated the previous order.3" The Tenth Circuit refused to
find frustration based only upon the failure of negotiations.36
The decision also reaffirmed the court's view that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 71A guarantees the right to a jury in a condemnation proceeding.37
26. 58 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1995).
27. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 571.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994). Alternatively, HSC asserted a private right to emi-
nent domain under an Oklahoma law providing condemnation power for a "sanitary purpose," but
the district court held that these grounds were not necessary because the AWA grounds deter-
mined the case. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 571-73; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 6 (West 1991). HSC
launched its claim that the Whiteheads do not have the right to a jury trial based upon this state
law claim. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 576.
31. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 573-74.
32. Id. at 573. HSC's counsel admitted that the EPA would have condemnation power in the
instant situation, but that HSC was not linked to the EPA. Id. at 572; see Commercial Sec. Bank
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1972) (limiting the AWA to preserving
jurisdiction, not granting jurisdiction over people or property).
33. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 574-75 (citing New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 168-78).
34. Id. at 575.
35. Id. at 575-76.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 576. Rule 71A(h) states that if a tribunal is not specifically provided for by an act
of Congress, a party may have a jury trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h) (emphasis added). The Su-
preme Court, however, has declared that "there is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent
domain proceedings." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18, 20 (1970) (providing that "[tihe
rule gives the trial court discretion to eliminate a jury entirely"); see also 12 WRIGHT Er AL.,
supra note 15, § 3051, at 123-25 & n.56 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (noting that the landowner may
demand a jury, but that the court may refuse); Searles, supra note 7, at 356-57 (stating that federal
claimants have a right to demand a jury trial unless the court appoints a commission).
The Tenth Circuit, in Hardage, recognized certain exceptions to the jury right, and stated
that the district court did not make appropriate findings for exceptions. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 576
n.5. The trial court did appoint a commission for the valuation. Id. at 573. The Tenth Circuit also
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Federal law governs a CERCLA action; therefore, the court determined that
Mr. Whitehead was due a "panoply of due process rights" under the Fifth
Amendment."
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision to limit the jurisdiction of the AWA was
reasonable. 9 First, the AWA itself does not explicitly mention power of con-
demnation.' The Tenth Circuit correctly relied upon New York Telephone,
which recognized that "unreasonable burdens may not be imposed," to deter-
mine the AWA's boundaries." New York Telephone relied on the AWA for a
partial, temporary taking, as opposed to the "full-blown eminent domain pro-
ceeding" in Hardage, which imposed severe burdens on the innocent neighbor
to the Superfund site.42 The Supreme Court has not extended the AWA to al-
low a permanent taking, primarily because CERCLA's congressional intent
was not to allow third party condemnation authority.43 Indeed, the Supreme
Court cautioned against the inherent dangers in expanding the AWA too far."
Second, the Tenth Circuit realistically considered that failed negotiations
may not necessarily be an attempt to thwart a judicial order.45 The new test
for finding frustration, as articulated in Hardage, requires proof of either: (1)
noted that both attorneys misled the trial court as to the jury trial right offered in its circuit. Id. at
576. In addition, the court noted that HSC's argument on appeal-that the Whiteheads simply
failed to demand a jury-was disingenuous because the trial court determined that the Whiteheads
could not have a jury prior to the point at which they could have demanded one. Id.
38. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 576.
39. The courts have traditionally used the AWA for the following procedural injunctive
actions and writs of mandamus: protecting the right to a jury trial; staying proceedings; denying a
stay of proceedings; reviewing orders compelling discovery; motions to dismiss; new trials; class
actions; reviewing requests for judge disqualification; transfers; and writs of habeas corpus. 16
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 3932, 3935.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
41. New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 172 ("We agree that the power of federal courts to impose
duties upon third parties is not without limits .... "); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
42. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 575. Many other important distinctions exist between Hardage and
New York Tel.: (1) the phone company was not innocent like Whitehead; (2) unlike Whitehead,
the phone company had a public duty; (3) the phone company's burden was minor, whereas
Whitehead risked becoming landlocked; (4) the FBI had no other manner in which to accomplish
its investigation, whereas the government could use the EPA to obtain Whitehead's land; (5) un-
like HSC, the FBI needed assistance with law enforcement; and (6) the Supreme Court found
congressional intent to allow the FBI access to phone lines, whereas CERCLA does not grant third
party condemnation power. Id. at 569-74; New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 174-76.
43. The AWA does not allow "exercise of a specific nonexistent power." 16 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 3933, at 225.
44. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) ("While courts
have never confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of 'jurisdiction,' it is clear
that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the
invocation of this extraordinary remedy."). See generally Paul Ganson, The SEC Speaks in 1995:
Recent Judicial Developments, 880 PRAC. L. INSTJCORP. L. & PRAc., 613 (1995) (noting that a
recent case denied use of the AWA to base a sua sponte exercise of jurisdiction over a person
who was not a party to the action).
45. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 575 (stating that "the 'frustration' of [the] prior order was simply
the product of the inability of either side to agree upon a fair price"). A court traditionally finds
frustration when a direct order is thwarted, even by a third party. Id. The Hardage order, however,
compelled HSC to acquire the land, not to condemn the land. Id. at 571.
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intentional refusal to bargain in good faith; or (2) intentional balking to ob-
struct a court order. '
D. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's refusal in Hardage to expand the substantive berth of
the AWA in a condemnation proceeding is consistent with case law in other
circuits.47 The narrow definition of "frustration" of a court order is also in
accord with other circuits, where courts traditionally limit frustration to situa-
tions in which the obstruction had a taint of wrongdoing or when law enforce-
ment required assistance.'
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND VALUATION OF SUBSURFACE MINERALS:
UNITED STATES V. CONSOLIDATED MAYFLOWER MINES, INC.49
A. Background
1. Valuation of Taken Property: The Highest and Best Use Test
Once a court determines that the government has taken property from an
individual with adequate authority, the government must give "just compensa-
tion."50 Determination of "just compensation" involves the land's market val-
ue as determined by the "highest and best use" test."' This test compensates
the landowner for only the most worthwhile use of the property. 2 Under
Olson v. United States,53 the government must consider all uses54 where
46. Id. at 575 (stating that "both parties must bear some responsibility for their negotiating
failure").
47. See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1979) (limiting
the AWA to provide jurisdiction for technical assistance to law enforcement, and not authorizing
the power "to order a party to bear risks not otherwise demanded by law"). At least one other cir-
cuit has used the AWA to enforce condemnation orders, but not to authorize a third party's power
to condemn without a statutory grant. Cole v. United States, 657 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.) (finding
injunction proper to prohibit condemnee interference with government possession), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
48. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit found frustration when
the EPA refused to comply with an order forcing promised funding of a municipal sewer project.
Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 954 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1992); see also National Org.
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an
appointment of a master to monitor compliance with an order was permissible under the AWA).
49. 60 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For recent in-depth discussions
of just compensation, see Michael Debow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Re-
form, 46 S.C. L. REv. 579 (1995); Clynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is
Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721 (1993).
51. Sidney Z. Searles, Highest and Best Use: The Keystone of Valuation in Eminent Domain,
C791 ALI-ABA 315, 315 (1993) (discussing the highest and best use doctrine: its meanings, ori-
gins, and effects on value).
52. Id. at 318 (quoting the earliest appearance of the test in In re Furman Street, 17 Wend.
669 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)). Current use of the land does not dictate the outcome of the doctrine.
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878) (providing that "property is not to be deemed
worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste"). Important factors to determine highest and
best use include land availability, land adaptability, need or demand for a use, and other possible
uses. Searles, supra note 51, at 321.
53. 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
54. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255. The Supreme Court has stated that compensation includes the
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there is a reasonable probability that the property will adapt to that use, and a
demand for that use in the "reasonably near" future.55 The government does
not consider any remote and speculative uses dependent upon extrinsic condi-
tions in the valuation.56
2. Valuation of Undeveloped Subsurface Minerals
Due to the inherently speculative nature of interests in undeveloped miner-
al deposits, complex valuation doctrines become even more difficult to apply
in mineral valuation disputes.57 For example, strict adherence to the Olson
test of "reasonable probability in the reasonably near future"58 would disallow
compensation for any speculative mineral deposit.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that speculative values for
undeveloped minerals are inevitable and yet may be compensable if (a) they
have an ascertainable market value and (b) extraction is the highest and best
use for the land. This realization in Montana Railway v. Warren' directly
conflicts with the Olson "reasonably probable" standard for compensation.
Under Montana Railway, a court may consider a speculative use in valuation
either before the vein has been fully exploited or the use is "reasonably prob-
able."'
The tension between Olson and Montana Railway causes complex valua-
tion disputes, exacerbated because the rule set forth in Olson did not involve a
subsurface mineral valuation.62 Montana Railway held that even though the
undeveloped mine in question was "only a prospect," mining prospects are
subjects of business transactions and, therefore, affect market value of com-
pensation."
land's "fair market value for all available uses and purposes." United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 80-81 (1913).
55. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255-57 (disallowing a valuation based upon use of shoreland as a
reservoir where the landowner has little possibility of acquiring all other lands necessary for that
use); see 4 SACKMAN, supra note 8, § 12B.12, at 12B-90 (discussing the prominence of the Olson
test); Searles, supra note 51, at 322 (discussing methods of proving highest and best use).
56. Olson, 292 U.S. at 256. Contra Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1890)
(allowing valuation for a speculative mining use). Possible uses that "have no perceptible effect
upon present market value" will not be compensated, but if extrinsic conditions are probable and
affect market value, they may be considered. 4 SACKMAN, supra note 8, §§ 12B.12, 12B-113.
57. See Joseph M. Montano, Valuation of Lands with Mineral Deposits, C791 ALI-ABA
269, 271-73 (1993) (discussing various solutions to the problem of speculative mineral values).
58. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255-57.
59. Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 352-54 (allowing compensation for in-place minerals);
Montano, supra note 57, at 272 (noting a number of different valuation doctrines used to compen-
sate for speculative mineral deposits).
60. 137 U.S. 348 (1890).
61. Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 352.
62. Olson, 292 U.S. at 248-55 (considering the possibility of using shoreland as a reservoir).
63. Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 352. This recognition of the "market value" concept in mineral
rights was reiterated as recently as 1989, after the Olson opinion, with regard to mineral lease
appraisals. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 628 n.3 (1989). The Tenth Circuit noted this
affirmation, despite that court's contrary outcome. United States v. Consolidated Mayflower
Mines, Inc., 60 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
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B. United States v. Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc.64
1. Facts
To relocate a highway, the government used eminent domain powers to
take 18.22 acres of land owned by Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc.
(CMMI).65 The government argued that it should base compensation on the
land's use for recreational home development.' CMMI argued for compensa-
tion based upon access to its Mayflower Mine.67 CMMI's mine leases were
subject to the consent of the current surface property owners, Stitching May-
flower Mountain/Recreational Fonds (Stitchings), who had refused to consent
to mining activities.' 8 CMMI and the government differed as to the profitabil-
ity of the mining venture.' The jury indicated that, based on the Olson test,
the highest and best use for the land was home development.7"
2. Decision
The Court of Appeals noted that the Olson requirement excludes unex-
ploited mineral deposits under the taken land.7' The court further stated that
Olson conflicts with Montana Railway, where speculative mining "prospects"
were determined to have market value.72 Despite this discord, the Tenth Cir-
cuit followed United States v. 494.10 Acres of Land,73 a decision where the
court adopted the Olson "reasonably near future" requirement for mineral
evaluation.74 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit currently requires a finding of
reasonably probable mineral values in order to qualify for compensation.75
64. 60 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
65. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1471.
66. Id. at 1471-72.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1472. CMMI brought a second ground for appeal based upon Stitchings' "double-
teaming" with the government. Id. at 1477-78. Although Stitchings' standing was limited to pro-
tection of their royalty rights, its stance was adverse to CMMI. Id. at 1478. For example, Stichings
"often sounded as if [it] were seeking an injunction against a mining operation about to begin"
and testified that they would not have consented to the operations. Id. The court found no basis
for CMMI's claim because Stitchings' influence was minimal. Id. The court noted in dicta, how-
ever, that it thought the district court abused its discretion by allowing Stitchings to exceed their
standing limitations. Id.
69. Id. at 1472-74.
70. Id. at 1475. The instructions also provided that the "[miere possibility of a use is not
enough" and "[s]peculative schemes of the owner or witnesses are to be excluded from your con-
sideration." Id.
71. Id. at 1476.
72. Id. at 1476-77 (citing Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 353).
73. 592 F.2d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusing to compensate for speculative underlying
sand and gravel value).
74. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1477. Thus, the jury instructions were not prejudicial according to
de novo review. Id. at 1475-77 (citing Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d
1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995)). The court also noted that a change in the instructions would not
have altered the jury verdict due to the tenuous nature of development. Id. at 1477.
75. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon several other opinions utilizing the
Olson standard. None of these, however, involved mineral valuations. See United States v.
77,819.10 Acres of Land, 647 F.2d 104, 110 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying the test in a farmland con-
demnation case contemplating a hunting use), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v.
46,672.96 Acres of Land, 521 F.2d 13, 15 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying the test in a condemnation
case contemplating use for a missile range); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901, 908 (10th Cir.
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C. Analysis
This case confirms the Tenth Circuit's willingness to apply the Olson test
to value unexploited minerals, despite the tension between the Olson test and
the holding in Montana Railway. This decision may give the government an
unfair advantage in condemnation proceedings because the value and nature of
most mineral deposits have an inherently speculative nature.76 The decision in
494.10 Acres initially adopted the Olson "reasonably likely to take place in the
near future" requirement,77 and Mayflower consummates the adoption by em-
bracing the "reasonably probable" standard for minerals.7" Mayflower,
therefore, reinforces the trend from Montana Railway to Olson,79 despite the
appearance that Montana Railway governs the issue.8"
D. Other Circuits
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have applied the Olson test to evaluate
unexploited subsurface minerals despite the conflict with Montana Railway."'
Other circuits follow Olson in condemnation proceedings, but have yet to
apply Olson to an unexploited mineral case.82
The Fifth, Ninth, and, to some extent, Eleventh Circuits have applied the
Montana Railway standard to compensate for unexploited minerals.83
1965) (applying the test in a ranchland condemnation case contemplating severance damages).
76. Montano, supra note 57, at 271-72.
77. 494.10 Acres, 592 F.2d at 1132 (holding that the near future "element of use" was sig-
nificant) (quoting Olson, 292 U.S. at 255) (emphasis added). This decision conflicted with a prior
holding allowing speculative valuations of minerals. United States v. Silver Queen Mining Co.,
285 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1960) ("[Rlequired proof need rise no higher than the circumstances
permit. Some speculation is inherent in the ascertainment of value of all resource property .... ").
Indeed, even after 494.10 Acres, the Tenth Circuit recognized that awards may still be granted to
speculative mineral deposit holders. United States v. 179.26 Acres of Land, 644 F.2d 367, 372-74
(10th Cir. 1981) (holding no error in consideration of underlying limestone while relying on Silver
Queen Mining, 285 F.2d at 510).
78. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1476-77 (emphasis added).
79. Silver Queen Mining relied heavily upon the Montana Ry. allowance of speculative valu-
ations for subsurface mineral condemnation. Silver Queen Mining, 285 F.2d at 510.
80. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 628 n.3 (1989) (citing Montana Ry., 137
U.S. at 352-53) (noting that "whatever the difficulties may be in making [mineral] appraisals with
complete accuracy, it does not defeat the existence of a 'market value' in mineral rights").
81. See United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 290, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
that the highest and best use of the condemned land was the potential use for sand mining based
on a commercially exploitable amount); United States v. 91.90 Acres of Land, 586 F.2d 79 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). Although the Eighth Circuit did not cite Olson in
this opinion, it did require a market for the minerals, which is tied to the "reasonably probable in
the reasonably near future" test. Id. at 86; see supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
82. See United States v. 27.93 Acres of Land, 924 F.2d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 1991) (excluding
compensation based on prospect of rezoning as speculative); United States v. 47.3096 Acres of
Land, 583 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. 1978) (excluding evidence based upon the Olson standard for
demand in the near future in a residential land takings case).
83. See St. Genevieve Gas Co. v. T.V.A., 747 F.2d 1411, 1413-14 (1 th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the district court did not err in finding that no potential for production existed); Cal-Bay Corp.
v. United States, 169 F.2d 15, 19 (9th Cir.) (taking judicial notice of the fact that land with even a
"prospect[] of possible successful development" has a market value), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859
(1948); Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 1944) (allow-
ing compensation for "reasonable possibilit[iesl of production in paying quantities"). CMMI re-
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Furthermore, in Phillips v. United States, 4 the Ninth Circuit noted that "[tihe
Supreme Court has answered [the unexploited mineral valuation] question" in
Montana Railway.5 The Eleventh Circuit applied the probable standard to a
taken mineral lease, but noted that the lease would not have survived scrutiny
even under the less arduous possibility standard. 6 Although a recent Supreme
Court case cited the Montana Railway approach, the circuits remain split as to
which Supreme Court authority to follow. s7
III. TITLE TO ISLANDS UNDER AMBIGUOUS FEDERAL GRANTS:
KOCH V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
8 8
A. Background
1. Origin of Title
Until all of the states became part of the Union, the federal government
held, in trust, those lands not possessed by the original thirteen states.8 9 The
"equal footing doctrine" allowed each new state to enter the Union with the
same rights as original states; as a result, the new state took the shores, beds,
and submerged lands of navigable waters upon entry into the Union.' ° The
United States, however, retained the islands in navigable rivers." Land in
non-navigable waters did not pass to the states under the equal footing doc-
trine.92 The federal government may pass title to these lands along with a
quested an instruction based upon Cal-Bay. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1475.
84. 243 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1957).
85. Phillips, 243 F.2d at 5. The court held that the trial court erred in relying solely on high-
est and best use because "where there is a reasonable POSSIBILITY of production in paying
quantities, [and] mineral rights are a common subject of barter and sale," a reasonable probability
of successful development exists. Id. at 6 (quoting Eagle Lake, 141 F.2d at 564) (emphasis in
original).
86. St. Genevieve Gas, 747 F.2d at 1413 n.4 (finding the substantial unprofitable develop-
ment conclusive that mining was not compensable). The court adopted the Fifth Circuit view, as
per the circuit split in 1981, but seemed uncertain as to what that view entails. Id.
87. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 628 n.3 (1989) (citing Montana Ry., 137
U.S. at 352-53) (noting that "whatever the difficulties may be in making [mineral] appraisals with
complete accuracy, it does not defeat the existence of a 'market value' in mineral rights").
88. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995).
89. See generally David W. Gross, Examining Aboriginal Rights in Submerged Lands:
Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 139 (1993) (discussing the equal footing doc-
trine).
90. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-71
(1977); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 425-26 (1867); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). The equal footing doctrine derives from the United States
Constitution. Denise Dosier, Note, The Clouds Are Lifting: The Problem of Title to Submerged
Lands in Alaska, 8 ALASKA L. REv. 271, 273 & n.10 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3). For a
discussion of the equal footing doctrine, and navigability theories of ownership, see Philip W.
Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of Riparian and Littoral Title Prob-
lems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 265, 270-73 (1991).
91. Kemp Wilson, Ownership of Mineral Interests Underlying Inland Bodies of Water and
the Effects of Accretion and Erosion, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14-1, 14-4 to 14-5, 14-22
(1984) (discussing exceptions to the equal footing doctrine).
92. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-57 (1926) (applying navigability
standards to determine that a lake was in fact navigable, and therefore, it belonged to the state);
Gross, supra note 89, at 145 n.48. For a discussion of tests determining navigability for purposes
of riverbed ownership, see Wilson, supra note 91, at 14-7 to 14-15.
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patent to surrounding riparian lands, or keep them as public land as expressed
in the surrounding land grant itself.93
The government passes title by surveying land, by including that survey in
an official plat, and then incorporating that plat into a grant by reference. 94
When a plot of land borders a stream or river, the surveyor "meanders" that
river by following the turnings of the river to set a record of its course.95 Un-
surveyed lands, those islands not meandered, remain the property of the Unit-
ed States and cannot pass from federal ownership. 96
2. Omission or Ambiguous Description of Islands
Occasionally, a survey will omit an island, or will contain ambiguous or
erroneous information about the island.97 Over time, the Supreme Court has
constructed a twisting course of authority to manage this problem, leading to
varying interpretations." First, courts generally use two interpretive doctrines:
(1) that no property right passes by implication;" and (2) that "nothing
passes but that which is conveyed in clear and explicit language.""
93. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922).
94. Snake River Ranch v. United States, 542 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir. 1976); see Jefferis v.
East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 194-95 (1890) (finding that an incorporated plat includes
accretion to the land up to the date of the plat); Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 123 (10th
Cir. 1969) (noting that because a plat omitted riparian fast land, land belonged to the United
States).
95. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891) (holding that meander lines merely
ascertain what lands are to be paid for, they do not limit the title to their lines); George J.
Morgenthaler, Surveys of Riparian Real Property: Omitted Lands Make Rights Precarious, 30
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 19-1, 19-10 & nn.19-21 (1984) (providing that "for various reasons,
meander lines are inherently inaccurate, meant only to approximate the course of a water body");
see also Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 512 (1905) (stating that the meander helps fix a
price). But cf. Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 U.S. 300, 306 (1899) (holding that a surveying error
"does not enlarge the title conveyed by the patents").
96. See United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 311 U.S. 317, 344 (1940) (finding that unsur-
veyed and ambiguous grants retain title in the United States); Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting
Club v. United States, 260 U.S. 561, 564 (1923) (holding that ordinary rules do not apply where
land was unsurveyed); Walton, 415 F.2d at 124 (noting that omitted and unsurveyed lands re-
mained in the possession of the United States). The Bureau of Land Management has consistently
applied this principle to riparian island disputes. See Loyla C. Waskul, 102 I.B.L.A. 241 (1988);
Emma S. Peterson, 39 PUB. LANDS DEC. 566 (1911).
97. Jeems Bayou, 260 U.S. at 563-64 (finding that 500 acres missing from initial survey was
an omission). Islands are considered omitted when they are permanent, dry, and "large enough that
a reasonable surveyor would consider it surveyor error if the island were omitted in a survey."
Lear, supra note 90, at 274-75.
98. Bourgeois v. United States, 545 F.2d 727, 730 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that navigability
may play a key role in determining the ownership of the island). However, the factor tests dis-
cussed later seem to be more prevalent. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 101-08
and accompanying text.
99. See MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir.) (applying rule to a
statute to dismiss appeal), cert. granted sub nom. Great N. Ry. v. United States, 314 U.S. 596
(1941), modified, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942); Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1919)
(dismissing appeal based on rule). The interpretive doctrine against implication may originate in
the desire to retain sovereign power "to achieve important public purposes." Joseph L. Sax, Rights
That "Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 943, 948 (1993).
100. Caldwell, 250 U.S. at 20. Many, sometimes conflicting, interpretive doctrines for riparian
land disputes exist, including: reliability of patents; patents favor the United States; patents favor
the grantee; no implied government reservations; no implied government grants; and the govern-
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Second, several factors indicate the intention to either exclude or include
islands in the grant.'0 ' The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lane,
'02
found value, location, size, terrain, and presence or absence of fraud persua-
sive elements in assessing intent to dispose of the land." 3 Courts also inter-
pret grants as passing title when the surveyor excluded the land due to its
valuelessness at the time of the survey.' 4 Courts generally include unsur-
veyed lands in patents, °5 except for unusually large islands likely omitted by
error.'" The Surveyor General's instructions on meandering also relieve am-
biguity in a grant: instructions to find lands suitable for cultivation will pass
"inconsequential fragments,"'0 7 while instructions to note the existence of
any islands will retain federal possession.'
The third signpost on the Supreme Court's winding road consists of two
cases: Moss v. Ramey"9 and Scott v. Lattig."° These cases held that the ex-
istence of a mistake or error, rather than an ambiguity, demonstrates federal
intent to keep title."' Fourth, deliberate fraud perpetrated by the surveyor to
take land from the government demonstrates federal retention of
possession."' These four elements show the government's intent with respect
to possession of excluded islands.
Additionally, a choice of law problem arises with ambiguous or mistaken
title disputes.' In Moss and Scott, the Supreme Court applied federal law in
ment must produce clear and convincing evidence. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-44 to 19-
50.
101. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-50 (noting that courts often resort to factual tests for
riparian land disputes). Some important factual tests are: (1) whether occupation, improvement,
and use demonstrate intent; (2) survey accuracy; (3) value; (4) size; (5) government acceptance of
the survey; and (6) historical evidence. Id. at 19-50 to 19-55.
102. 260 U.S. 662 (1923).
103. Lane, 260 U.S. at 665; see Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208 (1896) (applying the
"substantial area test" to determine that the actual number of acres surveyed and included on the
plats limited that plat); Thomas B. Bishop Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 96 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.)
(including an adjacent sandpit overlooked in the meander, based on the Lane factors), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 623 (1938).
104. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 451 (1908) (not-
ing that "Ithe islands are little more than rocks, rising very slightly above the level of the water");
Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 511 (1905) (concerning small islands, "frequently covered
with water," that the Land Department refused to survey); Grand Rapids & I.R. Co. v. Butler, 159
U.S. 87, 89 (1895) (addressing a low sandbar usually covered with water).
105. Lane, 260 U.S. at 664-65 (citing Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 414 (1891)).
106. Id. (citing Jeems Bayou, 260 U.S. at 563). The prominence of the factual situations may
be the only way to reconcile the conflicting decisions because courts interpret the navigability
factor in conflicting ways as well. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28 (noting that a navigable
river case is routinely applied to non-navigable disputes).
107. Whitaker, 197 U.S. at 513.
108. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 241 (1913) (using surveying instructions and size of island
in question to show surveyor error).
109. 239 U.S. 538 (1916).
110. 227 U.S. 229 (1913).
111. Moss, 239 U.S. at 546 (distinguishing Whitaker based on that case's unstable land and
the Land Department's refusal to survey); see Scott, 227 U.S. at 241-43 (finding that an error in
the survey did not work to dispose of the large quantity of land while holding that "[tlitle to is-
lands remains in the United States, unless expressly granted"). But see Jordan, 140 U.S. at 400
(requiring extraordinary proof to show mistake and finding none in regard to large spit concerned).
112. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-31 to 19-41.
113. Federal law considers omitted islands government property, whereas state law grants the
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the wake of a mistaken survey," 4 whereas in Oklahoma v. Texas,"5 the Su-
preme Court applied state law to an overtly ambiguous grant." 6 These diver-
gent results demonstrate that considerable conflict exists regarding the applica-
tion of federal law to previously private or state owned lands." 7 The Su-
preme Court, in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co.," held that state law governs riparian lands not passed under the equal
footing doctrine." 9 The Supreme Court, however, has also stated that the
United States retains title to islands not expressly granted, a result which may
conflict with state law.'20 Thus, tension remains as to whether state law will
always apply to riparian lands,'2' or whether federal law applies according to
the Lane factors for erroneous surveys.'22
B. Koch v. United States Department of Interior'23
1. Facts
An initial survey of the Colorado River described nine islands on a non-
navigable portion of the river. The survey, however, did not meander the
islands and, as a result, they remained officially unsurveyed.'24 The parties
riparian landowner title to the center of the water body. Lear, supra note 90, at 272-75. Basic
property rights are a traditional state area of law. Frank E. Maloney, The Ordinary High Water
Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled Boundary Line, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 465, 476
(1978).
114. See Moss, 239 U.S. at 546; Scott, 227 U.S. at 241-42.
115. 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
116. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 594-95 (issuing an ultimatum that absent contrary intent, state
law applies to all conveyances); see also Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 377 (holding that state law applied
to navigable riverbed lands passed in an ambiguous grant); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519
(1903) (stating that state law applied to a non-navigable lakeside property dispute and requiring
extraordinary proof to apply federal law). The factors used to interpret an ambiguous grant may
also be used to determine if error exists. See supra text accompanying notes 101-12.
117. John A. Lovett, Comment, Batture, Ordinary High Water, and the Louisiana Levee
Servitude, 69 TL. L. REV. 561, 598-603 (1994).
118. 429 U.S. 363 (1977). Although courts may overlook these authorities in a non-navigable
water dispute because they concern navigable waters only, the court does not limit itself in this
way; nor do commentators suggest that the distinction would change the principles applied. See
Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378 (speaking expansively of all land not passed under the equal footing
doctrine); Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28 (noting that a navigable river case is routinely
applied to non-navigable disputes).
119. Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378. The Court first extended federal law application to any land
that passed under the equal footing doctrine. Lovett, supra note 117, at 599-600 (citing Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 319 (1973)). Later, the Court overruled Bonelli Cattle, stating
that state law applied after the state had entered the Union. Id. at 600 (citing Corvallis, 429 U.S.
at 370-71). It remains unresolved whether Corvallis overruled only the equal footing portion of
Bonelli Cattle or also implicitly overruled the entire doctrine that applies federal law to federal
grants. Maloney, supra note 113, at 485. The Eleventh Circuit recently held that "state law gov-
erns the disposition of property held by a state regardless of whether or not the state acquired the
property as sovereignty land under the equal footing doctrine." Lovett, supra note 117, at 603
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 425 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
120. Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973) (citing Scott, 227 U.S. at 242-43) (apply-
ing federal law to a navigable river dispute). One commentator notes that Scott is routinely applied
to non-navigable river disputes. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28.
121. Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378.
122. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
123. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995).
124. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017-18. The survey was intended to locate saleable land in order to
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stipulated that the original survey did not meander the islands because they
lacked value at that time.' 25 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) assert-
ed that the United States owned the islands because they were not officially
surveyed, that they existed when the survey was conducted, 6 and that the
government is not bound by ambiguous grants. 7 Koch claimed ownership
of six of the islands based on patents incorporating the survey/plat by
reference.2 8 The district court, applying state law, determined that Koch held
title to the island. 29
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that because the islands exist in a non-navigable
part of the river, the islands did not belong to the State of Colorado under the
equal footing doctrine. 30 Additionally, the court refused to apply the general
rule of construction in favor of the government,' despite a finding that the
patent recorded did not demonstrate intent by the federal government to either
convey or keep the islands.'32 Recognizing that choice of law was an issue
of first impression in the Tenth Circuit,'33 the Court of Appeals relied on
Oklahoma and utilized state law to interpret the ambiguous federal grant.'34
Finally, Colorado state law vested title in the riparian land owner. 35
reduce the federal government's deficit, under the order of President Van Buren. PAUL W. GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 178 (1968).
125. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017. The islands may now have value as critical habitats for endan-
gered species. Brief for Appellant at 2, Koch, 47 F.3d 1015 (No. 93-1298). The government also
noted that this decision will cast doubt about the ownership of thousands of islands with valuable
mineral resources. Id.
126. Some commentators agree that these facts vest title in the government. See Lear, supra
note 90, at 274-75 (discussing possession of omitted islands).
127. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1018. The last of these grounds is merely a general rule of con-
struction, not a rule of law. Id. at 1019-20.
128. Id. at 1017.
129. Id. at 1018.
130. Id. at 1019 (citing Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.l (9th Cir.
1986) (recognizing the stipulations of the parties that the river is non-navigable, and noting that "a
court is not bound by stipulations of the parties as to questions of law")). The court reviewed all
questions of law de novo. Id. at 1018.
131. Id. at 1019-20 (citing Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 595).
132. Id. at 1019 (basing the decision upon the islands' low value, lack of access to the is-
lands, and silence in the patents as to the islands).
133. The court conceded that "the law of this circuit was unclear before this case" and that
"other circuits had disagreed over whether state law applied under these circumstances." Id. at
1021. Two Tenth Circuit cases relied upon in the parties' briefs were not mentioned in the opinion
since they pertained to riverbeds or submerged lands; in addition, neither explicitly dealt with the
choice of law problem. See Bradford v. United States, 651 F.2d 700, 706-07 (10th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the government must expressly reserve land); Snake River Ranch v. United States,
542 F.2d 555, 557-58 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying meander doctrines to determine a boundary).
134. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 595.
135. More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437 (Colo. 1977) (accepting as settled the proposition that
Colorado state law vests title in the riparian land owner). The district court result was not disput-
ed. See also Jordan, 140 U.S. at 383-84 (stating the common law rule recognizing the riparian
landowner's possession of the non-navigable riverbed to the center); United States v. Goodrich
Farms Partnership, 947 F.2d 906, 908 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Colorado law conveying land to




The Tenth Circuit has interwoven several Supreme Court "interpretive
techniques" to advance the rights of private riparian land owners against the
government. First, Koch limited the general rule of construction in favor of the
government to grants not involving patents on islands in adjacent waters.
3 6
The Tenth Circuit then distinguished Moss: Moss applied federal law only to
mistaken surveys, rather than ambiguous surveys such as the survey in the
instant dispute'37 which concerned purposely overlooked islands. 3 The
Koch opinion is also significant because it determined that state law controls
riparian grants.'39 This result complies with the dictum in Corvallis that state
law controls all riparian disputes when the equal footing doctrine is inapplica-
ble."4 Moreover, the Koch opinion evaded the factors test,'4 ' indicating
that the Tenth Circuit may have simply adopted the maxim that state law
applies to all riparian land controversies."'
The facts of Koch, however, are consistent with the factual tests used to
apply state law, namely low value, small size, an absence of fraud, and sur-
veying instructions based on the need for saleable land.'43 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit has probably decided that state law applies to ambiguous grants and
federal law applies to erroneous surveys.
D. Other Circuits
Different circuits have reached seemingly disparate results for choice of
law problems involving riparian land disputes. These differences, however,
may be distinguished upon factual circumstances."
The Sixth Circuit and the Federal Court of Claims have both applied state
law to ambiguous grants with regard to islands adjacent to the granted
136. Koch v. United States Dep't of Interior, 47 F.3d 1015, 1020 (10th Cir.) (citing Oklaho-
ma, 258 U.S. at 595), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995)).
137. Id. at 1020 n.5. The court noted the Sixth Circuit's rationale that Moss determines that
mistaken surveys do not affect the intent of the government to retain the lands. Id. (citing Wolff v.
United States, 967 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir.), affd, 974 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1992)). Although the
Tenth Circuit did not distinguish Scott, it also involved a mistaken survey. Scott v. Lattig, 227
U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913).
138. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017. The surveyors did describe the islands in their notes; they simply
did not meander them because of their low value. Id.
139. Id. at 1020.
140. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378
(1977); see also Lovett, supra note 117, at 600-01 (discussing the possible effects of Corvallis).
141. The Tenth Circuit relied upon these factors in a past case determining the ownership of
fast land on the Snake River, and applied federal law. Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 124
(10th Cir. 1969).
142. See Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378. "This Court has consistently held that state law governs
issues relating to this [navigable river bed], like other real property, unless some other principle of
federal law requires a different result." Id.
143. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017-18; see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. Keep in mind
that the Tenth Circuit itself did not focus on these factors, but merely relied on persuasive authori-
ty that did consider the factors.
144. The Tenth Circuit did not note these factual differences, leaving open the questions of
whether federal law applies to all riparian land disputes and whether facts involving surveyor error
will be treated differently. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1021 (noting a disagreement in the circuits).
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shoreland' 45 The Sixth Circuit carefully distinguished Moss, Scott, and simi-
lar opinions as dealing with mistakes, omissions, unheeded survey instructions,
and large valuable islands."4 The Court of Claims applied state law by first
applying federal common law, 47 then by interpreting Scott as placing only
navigable river islands in governmental ownership,' " and finally by deciding
to apply state law to non-navigable islands. 49
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have interpreted Scott to mandate the
application of federal law to large or valuable mistakenly omitted islands.5
The Ninth Circuit also left the government intent issue open to a case-by-case
analysis, suggesting that intent to retain possession may be tied to surveyor
error and value of islands.''
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made significant changes in the law
of real property during this survey period. Based on the outcome in Hardage,
parties responsible for cleaning Superfund sites must enlist the EPA's help to
condemn land in conjunction with a cleanup plan. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
protected the individual's ownership of property and also allowed good faith
negotiation failures without entailing the concept of "frustration" of a court
order. Although Mayflower limited an individual's right to compensation for
nonspeculative mineral rights, one may question the stability of this decision
145. Wolff, 967 F.2d at 224; Bourgeois v. United States, 545 F.2d 727, 731 (Ct. CI. 1976).
146. Wolff, 967 F.2d at 225-26 & n.3 (applying state law to both navigable and non-navigable
rivers); see also Wolff, 974 F.2d 702, 704-05 (relitigating the navigability issue by determining
that state law applies to non-navigable rivers, and that land in navigable rivers passed to the state
under the equal footing doctrine); accord Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922) (ap-
plying state law absent intent in grant to keep land); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 452 (1908) (passing "unsurveyed islands and neglected fragments");
Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 511-12 (1905) (passing unsurveyed island to private land-
owner under state law); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384 (1891) (applying state law to grants
lacking government reservation).
147. Bourgeois, 545 F.2d at 729-30 (citing Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 320-
21 (1973) as authority that federal law governs federal grants).
148. Id. at 730. The Court of Claims is the only court to interpret Scott in this manner; the
Sixth Circuit expressly rejected this interpretation, holding that state law applies regardless of the
river's navigability. Wolff, 967 F.2d at 226 n.3. The Court of Claims also characterized Oklahoma,
Jordan, and Mitchell as mandating the application of state law only for the beds of non-navigable
streams. Bourgeois, 545 F.2d at 730. The Court of Claims stands alone in this contention as well.
See generally Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28 (noting "[t]he river [in Scott) is navigable at
the point in question, but the navigability does not affect the application of the principles an-
nounced in the case to non-navigable waters").
149. Bourgeois, 545 F.2d at 731 (citing no authority for its position).
150. Ritter v. Morton, 513 F.2d 942, 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975) (stating
that federal law applies to federal grants, and citing Borax); United States v. Severson, 447 F.2d
631, 634-35 & nn.3-5 (7th Cir. 1971) (citing Scott, 227 U.S. at 242-43) (distinguishing Grand
Rapids, Chandler-Dunbar, and Whitaker as applying state law to valueless islands), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1039 (1972). Both of these cases predate the overruling of Borax by Corvallis. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
151. Ritter v. Morton, 513 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir.) (holding that "[w]e emphasize again the
need to view the factual circumstances in their totality"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). This
Survey intends to reconcile the holdings of the different circuits, but they may simply represent a
circuit split.
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based upon the circuit split and recent Supreme Court dicta affirming the
value of speculative mineral rights. Finally, the government attempted to re-
possess ambiguously granted islands, but Koch supported an individual's own-
ership by applying state law. This outcome may represent a maxim that ap-
plies state law to all disputes, or perhps an implicit reliance on the factor test
that reflects the government's intent to grant the omitted islands. Together,
these cases demonstrate the Tenth Circuit's willingness to protect individual
property rights, except in the controversial area of compensation for minerals.
Michelle Foley

